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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This sorry story of disloyalty and deception piled upon 
deception resulted in verdicts against the wrongdoers.  They’re 
not happy about that, but, when the tale is told, it’s clear that 
the result is entirely justified.  In brief summary, Kevin Huber 
stole confidential information from his employer Advanced 
Fluid Systems, Inc. (“AFS”), first for the benefit of an AFS 
competitor, Livingston & Haven, LLC (“Livingston”), with 
whom Huber wanted to ingratiate himself, and then, in another 
twist of deceit, for a company he created, Integrated Systems 
and Machinery, LLC (“INSYSMA”; together with Huber, the 
“Huber Parties”), to compete against both AFS and Livingston.  
When the facts began to come to light, AFS brought suit 
against the Huber Parties and Livingston, as well as Livingston 
employees Clifton B. Vann IV and Thomas Aufiero (together 
with Livingston, the “Livingston Parties”), alleging various 
claims under federal and state law, including principally trade 
secret misappropriation claims under the Pennsylvania 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (the “Trade Secrets Act” or the 
“Act”).  There was one other defendant, Orbital Sciences 
Corporation (“Orbital”), the company from which AFS, 
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Livingston, and INSYSMA were all trying to get business.  
AFS settled with Orbital before trial, and it is not one of the 
Appellants here.  All of the other defendants are.   
 
On summary judgment, the District Court held as a 
matter of law that the Huber Parties were liable under the Trade 
Secrets Act for misappropriating AFS’s trade secrets.  Then, 
following a bench trial, the Court held the Livingston Parties 
jointly and severally liable with the Huber Parties for that 
misappropriation, and it held all Appellants except Aufiero and 
INSYSMA liable for breach of fiduciary duty or aiding and 
abetting that breach.  As remedies for the tortious conduct, the 
Court awarded compensatory damages from all Appellants, 
exemplary damages under the Act from Huber, and, based on 
the breach of fiduciary duty, punitive damages from all 
Appellants except INSYSMA and Aufiero.1 
 
 
1  The terms “exemplary damages” and “punitive 
damages” are synonymous, see Damages, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (noting punitive damages are 
“[a]lso termed exemplary damages”), but the Trade Secrets Act 
uses the former term while common law causes of action tend 
to invoke the latter.  See 12 Pa. Const. Stat. § 5304(b) 
(permitting court to award “exemplary damages” if “willful 
and malicious misappropriation exists”); Hutchison ex rel. 
Hutchison v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 773 (Pa. 2005) (“This Court 
found that an award of punitive damages was proper for claims 
sounding in breach of fiduciary duty, as well as intentional 
withholding of information and fraudulent 
misrepresentation.”).  
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 Appellants bring a host of issues to us.  Their central 
argument, however, is that AFS’s claim for trade secrets 
misappropriation must fail because AFS does not “own” the 
purported trade secrets at issue.  Beyond their core grievance, 
Appellants also attack the District Court’s rulings that the 
claimed trade secrets are actually protectable under the Trade 
Secrets Act, that the Livingston Parties were not prejudiced by 
their counsel’s conduct at and following the trial, and that the 
damages awards were warranted.  In a thorough opinion, the 
District Court properly rejected Appellants’ ownership 
argument on the ground that the Act only requires that a 
plaintiff lawfully possess the trade secrets it wishes to 
vindicate.  In similarly persuasive decisions, the Court 
dismissed Appellants’ various remaining challenges as 
inconsistent with the record, untimely, legally deficient, or 
some combination thereof.  We agree with all of those 
conclusions and will affirm the Court’s rulings and judgment 
in their entirety.    
 
I. BACKGROUND2 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
 “AFS distributes, manufactures, and installs hydraulic 
components and hydraulic systems” that use pressurized fluids 
 
2 We derive this factual summary primarily from the 
District Court’s post-trial findings of fact and conclusions of 
law.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous ….”); Newark Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. City of 
Bayonne, 134 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 1998) (“In a bench trial, 
the court shall find the facts and state separately its conclusions 
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to move heavy machinery for complex operations and 
engineering projects.  Advanced Fluid Sys., Inc. v. Huber, 295 
F. Supp. 3d 467, 470 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (hereinafter, “Post-Trial 
Op.”).  Huber was employed at AFS as a full-time sales 
engineer between November 2006 and October 2012.  
Livingston is a competitor of AFS’s and designs, assembles, 
and installs hydraulic fluid systems.  Vann is the chief 
executive officer of Livingston’s holding company and 
Livingston’s president.  Aufiero worked at AFS from 1989 
through January 2011, when he left to become a regional sales 
manager at Livingston.   
 
 In September 2009, AFS entered into a three-year 
contract with the Virginia Commonwealth Space Flight 
Authority (the “Space Flight Authority” or the “Authority”) to 
build, install, and maintain a hydraulic system for the NASA 
rocket launch facility on Wallops Island, Virginia.  From that 
 
of law thereon and those [f]indings of fact ... shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted and alteration in original).  With respect to the facts 
pertinent to the District Court’s decision on summary 
judgment, we view them in the light most favorable to the non-
moving parties, see Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia, 527 F.3d 
299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008) (“It is well established that [on 
summary judgment] the court must view all evidence and draw 
all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party .… The rule is no different where there are cross-motions 
for summary judgment.”), though that is still highly 
unflattering for Appellants.  Our summary of the procedural 
history draws from the entire record, including the District 
Court’s memorandum resolving the parties’ post-judgment 
requests for relief.  
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island, Orbital launches its Antares rocket, employing the 
hydraulic system designed and installed by AFS.  The Antares 
rocket services and supplies the International Space Station.  
Huber was intimately involved in the development of the 
Wallops Island hydraulic system, eventually becoming its “de 
facto project manager[.]”  Id. at 473.  
 
 AFS supplied the Space Flight Authority with a 
comprehensive package of engineering drawings generated 
during the design and installation of the hydraulic system.  
Pursuant to the contract (the “Agreement”) between AFS and 
the Authority, all materials generated during performance of 
the Agreement were to be deemed “work for hire” and the 
“exclusive property” of the Authority.  Advanced Fluid Sys., 
Inc. v. Huber, No. 1:13-CV-3087, 2017 WL 2445303, at *2 
(M.D. Pa. June 6, 2017) (hereinafter, “Summary Judgment 
Op.”).  All drawings that AFS delivered to the Authority 
pursuant to the Agreement included an AFS title block with a 
confidentiality stamp.  In tension with the ownership 
stipulation in the Agreement, the confidentiality stamp read: 
“This drawing discloses propriety and confidential data of 
Advanced Fluid Systems, Inc., and may not be used disclosed 
or released, in whole or in part, for any purpose outside the 
authorized recipient, without signed authorization, and must be 
returned upon request.”  Post-Trial Op., 295 F. Supp. 3d at 484.   
 
 In September of 2012, the Space Flight Authority 
experienced financial difficulty.  As a result, Orbital acquired 
control of the launch system, including the hydraulic system 
that AFS had designed and manufactured.  AFS did not execute 
a non-disclosure agreement with Orbital, but Orbital 
maintained a practice of only disclosing AFS’s drawings on a 
need-to-know basis.   
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 Around this same time, Huber, while still working for 
AFS, began communicating with the Livingston Parties about 
the Wallops Island hydraulic system.  He claimed that Orbital 
was unhappy with AFS and was seeking new vendors to 
service the system.  He also took affirmative steps to help the 
Livingston Parties familiarize themselves with the system and, 
more generally, with Orbital’s operations on Wallops Island.  
He arranged tours and began sending the Livingston Parties 
various confidential AFS internal documents and engineering 
drawings.  To communicate with Huber, the Livingston Parties 
created a commercial Dropbox folder, installed a virtual 
private network on Huber’s AFS laptop, and provided him with 
a Livingston email address.   
 
 Orbital did eventually seek bids with respect to two 
aspects of the hydraulic system: a “gripper arms replacement” 
project and a “cylinder upgrade” project.  Regarding the 
gripper arms contract, Huber, while still employed by AFS, 
worked closely with the Livingston Parties to prepare a bid.  At 
the same time, he was also playing a key role in the bid 
presented by AFS, which he succeeded in inflating by over 
$130,000 to ensure that Livingston’s bid was more 
competitive.  Not surprisingly, Livingston was awarded the 
gripper arms contract.  During the ensuing design process, 
Livingston’s team relied extensively on confidential 
engineering drawings that AFS had created and Huber stole.   
 
 As to the cylinder upgrade project, Huber again stacked 
the deck against AFS by failing to disclose key information 
about what Orbital was looking for, encouraging AFS to 
submit a bid only for Orbital’s non-preferred option, and by 
working with the Livingston Parties to develop a proposal 
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based on confidential AFS documents that, again, he had 
provided.   
 
 In October 2012, Huber’s penchant for deceit led to 
another twist.  Unbeknownst to Livingston or AFS, he formed 
his own business entity, INSYSMA, intending to submit a 
competing bid for the cylinder upgrade contract.  That same 
month, he downloaded nearly 98 gigabytes of AFS’s 
proprietary files to an external hard drive, including its 
engineering drawings, bills of materials, and other documents 
for the hydraulic system, documents pertaining to AFS’s 
gripper arms quote, and all of its pending and past project files 
dating back to 1993.  He then tendered his notice of resignation 
to AFS.   
 
 Following his resignation, Huber continued to work 
with Livingston on its gripper arms design and its cylinder 
assembly bids, sharing with the Livingston team many of the 
files he had taken from AFS.  Livingston’s preparatory efforts 
and eventual bids relied heavily on drawings generated by AFS 
in the design of the Wallops Island hydraulic system, as well 
as other insider knowledge gathered from Huber.  Eventually, 
and to the Livingston Parties’ great surprise, Orbital awarded 
the cylinder contract to neither AFS nor Livingston but to 
INSYSMA.   
 
B. Procedural History 
 
 “AFS commenced this action on December 24, 2013, 
initially naming Huber, [INSYSMA], Livingston, Vann, 
Aufiero, and Orbital as defendants.”  Advanced Fluid Sys., Inc. 
v. Huber, 381 F. Supp. 3d 362, 370 (M.D. Pa. 2019) 
(hereinafter, “Post-Judgment Op.”).  AFS and Orbital reached 
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a settlement agreement pursuant to which AFS dismissed 
Orbital from the lawsuit in exchange for Orbital’s agreement 
to grant AFS a subcontract for certain work on the hydraulic 
system.  The settlement agreement, which does not identify 
Orbital as a joint-tortfeasor with Appellants, explicitly states 
that “no money is being paid” by Orbital pertaining to items of 
damages asserted by AFS against Appellants in this case.  
(App. at 2222.) 
 
 The claims that AFS asserted under federal law were 
either all dismissed or abandoned through motions practice and 
amended pleadings.  Ruling on motions to dismiss, the District 
Court determined that AFS had standing3 to assert trade secret 
misappropriation claims under Pennsylvania law against 
Appellants because AFS had adequately alleged lawful 
possession of the relevant trade secrets and “that ownership, in 
the traditional sense, is not prerequisite to a trade secret 
misappropriation claim.”  Advanced Fluid Sys., Inc. v. Huber, 
28 F. Supp. 3d 306, 323 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (hereinafter, “MTD 
Op.”).  Later, on summary judgment, the Court concluded as a 
matter of law that the information at issue qualified as trade 
 
3  The District Court recognized that the standing issue 
here is one of statutory standing, which requires 
“determin[ing], using traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause of action 
encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.”  Lexmark Int’l, Inc. 
v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014); 
cf. Commw. of Pa. v. Janssen Pharma., 8 A.3d 267, 275 (Pa. 
2010).  Here, the question is whether ownership of the trade 
secret is an element of a claim for misappropriation under the 
Act. 
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secrets and that the Huber Parties were liable under the Trade 
Secrets Act for misappropriating it.   
 
 The District Court convened a six-day bench trial on 
AFS’s remaining claims, specifically the claims for trade secret 
misappropriation against the Livingston Parties, and the claims 
for breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting breach of 
fiduciary duty.  At trial, the Livingston Parties were 
represented by Philip J. Morin, Esquire, of the law firm Florio 
Perrucci Steinhardt & Fader, LLC.  Morin and his firm were 
chosen by Livingston’s insurer.  During the trial, Morin 
informed the Court, on the record at a side bar, that he was not 
admitted to practice before it.  He also disclosed his 
disciplinary history, including a public reprimand in New 
Jersey and a reciprocal suspension imposed by New York in 
2015.  In response to the Court’s question of whether he was 
then “credentialed and fully admitted in both jurisdictions,” 
Morin stated that he “was authorized to practice in New Jersey 
but that New York required him to file a motion for 
reinstatement, which was pending.”  Post-Judgment Op., 381 
F. Supp. 3d at 371.  The Court instructed Morin to file the 
appropriate paperwork and permitted him to continue to 
represent the Livingston Parties at trial without further 
discussion.    
 
 After the trial, the Court issued an order directing the 
parties to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
within 30 days of receiving the official transcript, which 
deadline the parties later extended by stipulation, with the 
Court’s approval.  AFS and the Huber Parties timely filed their 
respective post-trial submissions, but the Livingston Parties 
never filed any, nor did they request an extension of time to do 
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so.  Morin did not disclose to the Livingston Parties that he had 
missed the filing deadline.  
 
 In its post-trial findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
the Court found that the Livingston Parties were liable for 
misappropriating AFS’s trade secrets, that Huber had breached 
a duty of loyalty to AFS, and that Livingston and Vann, but not 
Aufiero, aided and abetted that breach.  The Court awarded 
AFS compensatory damages from all Appellants, based on lost 
profits, exemplary damages under the Act against Huber alone 
for his trade secret theft, and punitive damages against Huber, 
Livingston, and Vann, jointly and severally, stemming from 
Huber’s breach of fiduciary duty. 
 
 Appellants then filed scattershot post-trial motions 
invoking subsections of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52, 
59, and 60, claiming, among other objections, that: (i) the 
Livingston Parties were entitled to a new trial because of the 
misconduct and negligence of their insurer-retained counsel; 
(ii) the evidence did not support a punitive damages award 
against the Livingston Parties; (iii) the District Court 
incorrectly failed to reduce its compensatory damages award 
by the amount of AFS’s settlement with Orbital; and (iv) 
certain additional costs were improperly excluded from the 
District Court’s lost-profits analysis.  After thorough analysis, 
the Court denied the post-trial motions in their entirety.  This 
timely appeal followed. 
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II. DISCUSSION4 
 
A. AFS’s Trade Secret Misappropriation 
Claims5  
 
The first and predominant issue in this appeal is whether 
AFS, by virtue of its Agreement with the Space Flight 
Authority – a contract that explicitly designates the 
confidential information at issue in this case as the Authority’s 
“exclusive property” – can maintain a trade secret 
misappropriation claim under Pennsylvania law.  Appellants 
argue that AFS cannot, for three reasons: first, AFS does not 
“own” the claimed trade secrets; second, even if the Trade 
Secrets Act does not require ownership as a prerequisite for 
standing to sue, AFS still lacks standing because it did not 
“lawfully possess” the trade secrets; and, third, what AFS 
argues are trade secrets cannot properly be designated as such 
because inadequate measures were taken to ensure their 
continued secrecy.  None of those positions is persuasive. 
 
 
4  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
   
5  We exercise de novo review over the District Court’s 
legal determinations that fee simple ownership of a trade secret 
is not a prerequisite to a misappropriation claim under the 
Trade Secrets Act and that AFS had protectable trade secrets 
as a matter of law.    See Simpson v. Att’y Gen., 913 F.3d 110, 
113 (3d Cir. 2019) (summary judgment); Blunt v. Lower 
Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 266 (3d Cir. 2014) (standing). 
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In a closely reasoned opinion, the District Court 
considered what interest a plaintiff must have in a trade secret 
to have standing under the Trade Secrets Act to bring an action 
for misappropriation.  After examining the text of the Act and 
surveying cases from other jurisdictions that have adopted 
some version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the District 
Court explained why it is appropriate to follow the reasoning 
set forth in DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT & T Corp., 245 F.3d 
327 (4th Cir. 2001).   
 
In DTM, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit held that a party asserting a misappropriation 
claim under Maryland’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act need only 
demonstrate lawful possession of a trade secret, and not 
“ownership in its traditional sense[,]” to maintain such a claim.  
DTM, 245 F.3d at 333.  That holding was based on the premise 
that “[t]he proprietary aspect of a trade secret flows, not from 
the knowledge itself, but from its secrecy[,]” because “[i]t is 
the secret aspect of the knowledge that provides value to the 
person having the knowledge. … While the information 
forming the basis of a trade secret can be transferred, as with 
personal property, its continuing secrecy provides the value, 
and any general disclosure destroys the value.”  Id. at 332 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
In other words, while ownership of the sort traditionally 
associated with real or personal property is sufficient to 
maintain a trade secret misappropriation claim because the 
complete bundle of rights related to trade secrets includes the 
right to enjoy the value of the information’s secrecy, it is not a 
necessary condition.  A per se ownership requirement for 
misappropriation claims is flawed since it takes account neither 
of the substantial interest that lawful possessors of the secrets 
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have in the value of that secrecy, nor of the statutory language 
that creates the protection for trade secrets while saying 
nothing of ownership as an element of a claim for 
misappropriation. 
 
Although DTM involved Maryland’s version of the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, we, like the District Court, agree 
with the Fourth Circuit’s cogent explanation of why lawful 
possession of a trade secret can, under circumstances like this, 
be sufficient to maintain a misappropriation claim, even absent 
ownership.  The relevant language of the Act, which on its face 
lacks any ownership requirement, is functionally identical to 
that of its Maryland counterpart.6  And, while DTM’s rationale 
rejects the notion that trade secrets are just like tangible 
property, it still rests on the premise that trade secrets are a 
species of property, a view entirely consistent with 
Pennsylvania’s common law prior to the enactment of its 
version of the uniform act.  See Heraeus Med. GmbH v. 
Esschem, Inc., 927 F.3d 727, 738 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(“Pennsylvania courts have adopted the ‘property’ view of 
trade secrets, under which the basis of a claim for trade secret 
 
6  In addition, as the District Court correctly recognized, 
“[n]either the commentary to the uniform law nor [the Trade 
Secrets Act]’s legislative history include[s] any specific 
reference to legal ownership of the trade secrets as a 
prerequisite to a cause of action.”  MTD Op., 28 F. Supp. 3d at 
318.  On the contrary, as a leading treatise recognizes, “because 
the gravamen of [a Uniform Trade Secrets Act] 
misappropriation action is wrongful acquisition or improper 
use of information gained from a plaintiff, possession, as 
opposed to ownership, suffices.”  4 Roger M. Milgrim & Eric 
E. Bensen, Milgrim on Trade Secrets § 15.01 (2020). 
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misappropriation is the violation of a property right[.]”).  
Again, the point is not that ownership is irrelevant.  The point 
is that it is not the sole kind of interest that is relevant and 
subject to protection.  Appellants’ briefing is devoid of any 
serious challenge to DTM’s reasoning.7  Their argument, such 
as it is, lacks merit, and we reject it. 
 
7  The Huber Parties merely note that the District Court 
was the first Pennsylvania court, state or federal, to follow 
DTM and that a district court in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania had held that a non-owner could not pursue a 
trade secret claim under Pennsylvania law.  Huber Parties’ 
Opening Br. at 24 (citing Transp. Compliance Assocs. Inc. v. 
Hammond, No. 2:11-CV-1602, 2012 WL 1435445, at *3 
(W.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2012), modified on reconsideration, 2012 
WL 8017416 (W.D. Pa. May 3, 2012)).  We are not troubled 
that the District Court was the first to follow DTM, particularly 
since it appears to be the first Pennsylvania court to actually 
analyze whether Pennsylvania law includes an “ownership” 
requirement.  For example, and as the District Court observed, 
Hammond “cursorily adopts an ownership approach without 
any discussion of the nature of trade secrets or the source of 
their value[,]” and, in support of that approach, relies entirely 
on a case that “did not turn on an ownership inquiry[.]”  MTD 
Op., 28 F. Supp. 3d at 322 n.8.  Other cases Appellants have 
relied on and that appear to adopt an ownership requirement 
were decided before adoption of the Trade Secrets Act and 
similarly lack any meaningful analysis of the ownership issue.  
More significantly, they address the issue of whether the party 
claiming misappropriation owned a trade secret, not the 
distinct question of whether other interests, such as lawful 
possession, can be sufficient to sustain a claim.  See, e.g., 
Gruenwald v. Advanced Comput. Applications, Inc., 730 A.2d 
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Appellants’ second contention, that AFS did not 
lawfully possess the information it claims as trade secrets, is 
similarly unavailing.  The gist of this argument is that the 
transfer of rights to the trade secrets effectuated by the 
Agreement included the transfer of any right to possess those 
trade secrets, thereby foreclosing AFS from lawfully 
possessing them.  But that ignores the uncontroverted record 
that AFS not only physically retained possession of the 
drawings and other information constituting the trade secrets; 
it also was required to use, and in fact did use, those trade 
secrets to fulfill its obligations under the Agreement and in 
contracts that AFS and Orbital entered into after the 
Agreement.  Moreover, despite necessarily being aware that 
AFS physically retained and was using the trade secrets to 
fulfill its contractual obligations, the “owner”8 of those secrets 
never once objected to, or even so much as questioned, AFS’s 
retention or use of those secrets.  It did not even push back 
when AFS affixed to documents containing the secrets a 
 
1004, 1012–13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (analyzing whether 
former employee retained “ownership” of technologies he 
created during scope of employment with former employer); 
Varo, Inc. v. Corbin Mfg. Co., 50 F.R.D. 376, 378 (E.D. Pa. 
1970) (noting “[m]ere possession is insufficient to establish the 
fact of ownership” where “Plaintiff’s sole position is that the 
defendant corporation is not the owner of the trade secrets”). 
  
8  Because AFS states in its brief that it “conveyed legal 
title to its work product to the [Authority],” Appellee’s Br. at 
47, we need not opine on any residual ownership interest it 
might otherwise claim and will treat the Authority as the 
owner. 
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confidentiality notice asserting that AFS had an ownership 
interest in them.   
 
Ownership of a trade secret – or any intellectual 
property for that matter – undoubtedly imbues the owner with 
the authority to give others lawful possession, including by 
merely consenting to that possession.  Such possessory rights 
were given to AFS, even if a full ownership interest was not.  
The course of conduct evident in the record shows that AFS 
clearly had permission to hold and use the secrets.  True, had 
the Agreement contained an explicit license for AFS’s benefit, 
any dispute about lawful possession could have been avoided.  
See Metso Minerals Indus. v. FLSmidth-Excel LLC, 733 F. 
Supp. 2d 969, 971–72 & n.4 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (holding non-
exclusive license to use trade secrets at issue constituted 
“lawful possession” of that information).  But Appellants cite 
no authority for the proposition that one who retains and uses 
a trade secret owned by another for that owner’s benefit, with 
that owner’s knowledge, and, at a minimum, with that owner’s 
implied consent, does not lawfully possess that trade secret.9  
We decline to adopt such a counter-intuitive rule of law.   
 
9  In that regard, the District Court correctly 
distinguished BlueEarth Biofuels, LLC v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 
No. CIV. 09-00181 DAE-KSC, 2011 WL 2116989 (D. Haw. 
May 25, 2011), aff’d, 531 F. App’x 784 (9th Cir. 2013).  In that 
case, the court held that the plaintiff could not sustain a 
misappropriation claim because it had “transferred, without 
reservation, all of the relevant confidential information and 
trade secrets” pursuant to an agreement.  Id. at *21.  Unlike the 
plaintiff in BlueEarth, however, AFS “remains in possession 
of and continues to use the trade secrets.”  MTD Op., 28 F. 
Supp. 3d at 323. 
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Finally, Appellants urge that the District Court erred in 
holding as a matter of law that the claimed trade secrets are 
protectable under the Trade Secrets Act.  They say that, at a 
minimum, there was a genuine dispute of material fact 
regarding the reasonableness of the measures taken to ensure 
the secrecy of the information at issue.  More particularly, 
Appellants point to the fact that the information was provided 
by AFS to the Space Flight Authority, a public entity subject 
to a state open-records law, without a formal non-disclosure or 
confidentiality agreement.  On the summary judgment record 
before us, however, we are not persuaded that a reasonable trier 
of fact could find that AFS’s interactions with the Authority, 
or with Orbital, extinguished AFS’s protectable interest in the 
trade secrets.  
 
Consistent with its approach throughout this lengthy 
litigation, the District Court fully explained its rationale for 
concluding that AFS could claim trade secret protection as a 
matter of law, applying the six-part framework that 
Pennsylvania courts adopted from the Restatement First of 
Torts § 757.10  See Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 
F.3d 102, 109 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Crum v. 
Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 907 A.2d 578, 585 
 
10  As we noted in Bimbo Bakeries, although [the Act] 
“displaced Pennsylvania’s common law tort for 
misappropriation of trade secrets, [] there is no indication that 
the statute effected a substantive shift in the definition of trade 
secret.” 613 F.3d at 109 n.7 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
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(Pa. Super. Ct. 2006)).11  As part of its analysis, the Court 
explained that the Space Flight Authority “honored AFS’s 
proprietary designation and did not disclose its information 
except as needed for operation of the [Wallops Island] 
Hydraulic System.”  Summary Judgment Op., 2017 WL 
2445303, at *11.   
 
Based on our own review of the record, we agree with 
that assessment.  The record shows that, even if the Authority 
did not contractually bind itself to do so, it nevertheless 
believed it had an obligation to preserve the confidentiality of 
AFS’s designs, and at all relevant times it conducted itself in a 
manner consistent with that belief.   
 
Appellants’ assertions regarding the Authority’s 
theoretical freedom to disclose AFS’s trade secrets, pursuant 
to Virginia’s open records law or otherwise, are entirely 
speculative.  They cite no evidence that the Authority failed to 
take reasonable steps to ensure the confidentiality of the trade 
secrets, or that it ever did disclose those secrets to anyone to 
whom disclosure was not essential for the development or 
maintenance of the Antares launch system at Wallops Island.  
Similarly, Appellants cite no evidence that the Authority was 
 
11  The District Court found that only the second factor, 
which addresses the extent to which AFS employees were 
privy to its confidential information, militated against trade 
secret status because AFS employees were not required to sign 
confidentiality agreements.  We agree with the District Court 
that, under the specific facts of this case, this single factor does 
not raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether AFS 
possessed trade secrets as a matter of law because the other five 
factors weigh decisively in the opposite direction. 
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ever actually subject to a records request relating to AFS’s 
trade secrets, that the probability of such a request was 
anything more than extremely remote, or how the Authority 
may have handled such a request if one were made.  Indeed, 
conspicuously absent from the record is any hint as to why, if 
AFS’s trade secrets were so readily obtainable from the Space 
Flight Authority, Appellants felt it necessary to engage in a 
coordinated, clandestine campaign of tortious conduct to 
obtain them.   
 
Therefore, we are in accord with the District Court’s 
conclusion that Appellants failed to raise a genuine dispute of 
material fact as to whether the confidential drawings and other 
information that they had a hand in stealing were not in fact 
and in law trade secrets.  Appellants’ arguments opposing 
AFS’s trade secrets misappropriation claims thus fail.12 
 
B. Conduct of Livingston Parties’ Counsel13  
 
The Livingston Parties take issue with the District 
Court’s denial of their request for a new trial based on the 
 
12  The Livingston Parties also argue that AFS cannot 
bring a misappropriation claim because it “did not stand to 
incur a loss if the trade secrets were misappropriated[.]”  
Livingston Parties Reply Br. at 9.  That argument, raised for 
the first time in a reply brief, is forfeited.  Haberle v. Borough 
of Nazareth, 936 F.3d 138, 141 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 
13  The District Court denied the Livingston Parties’ 
motion for a new trial made pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 59(a)(1)(B), 60(b)(1), 60(b)(3), and 60(b)(6).  We 
review that denial for abuse of discretion.  See Lazaridis v. 
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conduct of their lead trial counsel, Mr. Morin. Shortly 
following the entry of judgment against them, the Livingston 
Parties discovered that Morin had failed to gain formal 
authorization to practice before the District Court and also had 
failed to submit any post-trial proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.  According to the Livingston Parties, the 
first failure amounted to a fraud on the Court and the second to 
“excusable neglect,” both of which should entitle them to a 
new trial.  The District Court addressed those arguments in full 
and properly rejected them.  
 
First, the Livingston Parties complain that Morin 
represented them at trial despite never being admitted pro hac 
vice, thereby violating the District Court’s Local Rules and 
engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.  In so 
complaining, however, they fail to address – in fact, they 
simply ignore – our precedent regarding the application of 
local rules.   
 
“[A] district court can depart from the strictures of its 
own local procedural rules where (1) it has a sound rationale 
for doing so, and (2) so doing does not unfairly prejudice a 
party who has relied on the local rule to his detriment.”  United 
States v. Eleven Vehicles, Their Equip. & Accessories, 200 
F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2000).  The District Court had a sound 
 
Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (Rule 59); Budget 
Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008) (Rule 
60).  “[A] court abuses its discretion when its ruling is founded 
on an error of law or a misapplication of law to the facts.”  
Montrose Med. Grp. Participating Sav. Plan v. Bulger, 243 
F.3d 773, 780 (3d Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
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rationale for overlooking Morin’s technical non-compliance: it 
already had sufficient information to determine whether he 
should be admitted to practice pro hac vice, and it did not wish 
to further delay a case that was ready for trial and had taken 
four years to get to that point.  Moreover, the District Court 
correctly explained that the Livingston Parties could not have 
relied to their detriment on the District Court’s Local Rules 
regarding pro hac vice admissions because the “essential 
purpose” of those rules is to assist the Court, not to “protect an 
interest of the parties.”  Post-Judgment Op., 381 F. Supp. 3d at 
380–81.   
 
Under the circumstances, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion by refusing the Livingston Parties’ request 
to grant the extraordinary relief of a new trial, particularly since 
Morin’s non-compliance with the District Court’s Local Rules 
was essentially technical, not substantive, in nature.  Everyone 
in the case, including the Livingston Parties, knew of Morin’s 
role in the litigation and accepted it. 14   
 
Still pressing the point, however, the Livingston Parties 
say that Morin perpetrated a fraud on the District Court and on 
them by misleading the Court about the discipline he was 
subject to in New York, by failing to advise them of his 
disciplinary history and inability to practice before the Court, 
 
14  At least through the trial, the Livingston Parties seem 
to have been satisfied.  They fail to identify a single thing 
Morin did or failed to do during the trial itself that prejudiced 
them.  Cf. Post-Judgment Op., 381 F. Supp. 3d at 371–72 
(noting that Morin “zealously represented” the Livingston 
Parties at trial, made a “well stated” Rule 52(c) motion on their 
behalf and contributed to the case being “well tried[.]”).  
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and by “using Pennsylvania licensed attorneys who were never 
known by the Livingston Parties to have entered an appearance 
on their behalf.”  Livingston Parties Opening Br. at 28.  As for 
the first and third of those assertions, the record is plainly to 
the contrary.  The District Court pointed out that Morin had 
disclosed his suspension from practicing law in New York, and 
that there was a pending motion for his reinstatement in that 
jurisdiction.  Those disclosures were accurate in all relevant 
respects and were not misleading.  And it is certainly not 
believable that the Livingston Parties were unaware that other 
attorneys at Morin’s firm had entered appearances on their 
behalf.  Those other attorneys were present and assisted during 
depositions, pretrial proceedings, and trial, and they had signed 
the Livingston Parties’ pretrial pleadings and motions.   
 
Regarding the Livingston Parties’ contention that Morin 
defrauded them by not disclosing his disciplinary status, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 
Morin did not commit a fraud.  The Court determined that his 
conduct was, by all appearances, based on a “mistaken but 
good faith belief that reinstatement in New York would be a 
routine matter[.]”  Post-Judgment Op., 381 F. Supp. 3d at 375.  
Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion by declining to 
grant the Livingston Parties a new trial based on their own 
counsel’s purported failure to fully disclose his disciplinary 
history to them.  The Livingston Parties bear the responsibility 
for knowing who represents them.  It does not matter that 
Morin was chosen by their insurer.   
 
We do not minimize the seriousness of Morin’s failure 
to file post-trial submissions to summarize the Livingston 
Parties’ legal positions.  But any harm those parties suffered 
from the absence of those submissions was mitigated by the 
25 
 
Court’s awareness of the arguments they say should have been 
advanced.  Indeed, the arguments had largely been advanced 
in one form or another over the course of the drawn-out 
proceedings.  As the District Court noted, a detailed pretrial 
submission was filed and “raised many of the arguments that 
the Livingston defendants now claim, through new counsel, 
that Attorney Morin failed to present to the court.”  Post-
Judgment Op., 381 F. Supp. 3d at 376 n.6.  And, of course, the 
parties’ positions on various issues were evident through the 
course of trial.  The District Court expressly disclaimed that 
Morin’s failure to file a post-trial submission altered the 
outcome of this case, and the Court’s extensive efforts to 
independently assess the merits of AFS’s claims and anticipate 
and address the Livingston Parties’ well-known arguments, 
despite the lack of post-trial briefing from those parties, is 
apparent on the face of both the Court’s Post-Trial and Post-
Judgment Opinions.  For example, rather than simply adopt 
positions advocated by AFS, the Court after careful analysis 
declined to find that the Livingston Parties’ involvement in 
trade secret misappropriation was willful or malicious, or that 
Aufiero was liable to AFS for punitive damages.    
 
 Finally, the Livingston Parties maintain that Morin’s 
failure to file post-trial briefing constitutes “excusable neglect” 
entitling them to a new trial.  The District Court, consistent 
with our precedent, faithfully balanced the four relevant factors 
established by the Supreme Court in Pioneer Investment 
Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates. Ltd. Partnership, 507 
U.S. 380 (1993),15 for determining whether excusable neglect 
 
15  The four factors are: “the danger of prejudice to the 
[non-movant], the length of the delay and its potential impact 
on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including 
26 
 
warrants setting aside a final judgment.  It explained why the 
balance in this case fell decidedly against doing so.  
Specifically, the Court found that AFS would endure 
considerable prejudice by having to retry the case, because 
even a timely post-trial submission from Morin would not have 
changed the outcome of the case.  Moreover, a new trial would 
constitute a “disruption to efficient judicial administration,” 
given the substantial time and resources the Court had already 
dedicated to the matter.  Post-Judgment Op., 381 F. Supp. 3d 
at 377.  The Court also found that the failure to submit post-
trial briefing was not “excusable,” notwithstanding the 
personal difficulties Morin was dealing with at the time, 
because, among other reasons, the Livingston Parties had 
several other attorneys listed as counsel of record, all of whom 
 
whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and 
whether the movant acted in good faith.”  Id. at 395.  As the 
District Court noted, because it independently reached and 
assessed the merits of this case, irrespective of the lack of post-
trial briefing from the Livingston Parties, there is an argument 
to be made that Morin’s failure to file post-trial briefing does 
not implicate the “excusable neglect” standard contemplated 
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). Because we agree 
with the District Court that the Livingston Parties are not 
entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1), even assuming it applies, 
we do not reach the question of whether a party can claim 
excusable neglect when a district court independently 
adjudicates an issue on the merits, notwithstanding that party’s 
failure to make a relevant filing.       
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could have and should have been aware of the post-trial 
briefing deadline.16  Id. at 377–78. 
 
We discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s 
analysis, all of which is well supported by the record and 
consistent with governing legal principles.  While problems 
associated with Morin’s representation of the Livingston 
Parties may give rise to claims in another tribunal, the Court 
here acted well within its discretion in determining that any 
flaws in the representation did not entitle the Livingston Parties 
to the extraordinary relief of a new trial.   
 
C. Punitive Damages Award Against Vann and 
Livingston17  
 
In the next issue presented for review, Vann and 
Livingston contend that the District Court erred in awarding 
 
16  For that same reason, we reject the Livingston 
Parties’ argument that they were “effectively abandoned” by 
counsel.  Livingston Parties’ Opening Br. at 35.  There is no 
support for the assertion that Morin was the only attorney 
responsible for their case, or that the other attorneys who 
entered an appearance on their behalf were incapable of 
representing their interests.  
 
17  “Review of the District Court’s damages calculation 
is a mixed question of law and fact.”  VICI Racing, LLC v. T-
Mobile USA, Inc., 763 F.3d 273, 293 (3d Cir. 2014).  We accept 
the District Court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, 
but exercise plenary review over the Court’s choice, 
interpretation, or application of legal principles.  Id.  
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punitive damages against them both because the record lacks 
evidence that their conduct was egregious enough to justify the 
imposition of such damages and because the District Court 
incorrectly relied on their lack of remorse.  Again, we are 
unpersuaded. 
 
It is patently incorrect to say that the record lacks 
enough evidence to sustain an award of punitive damages 
against Vann and Livingston.  The District Court noted that 
Vann approved a compensation package for Huber that 
incentivized Huber to do damage to AFS, when Vann well 
knew that Huber remained within AFS’s employ and that he 
was “working directly against AFS’s interests” by “attempting 
to steer business toward Livingston and away from AFS[.]”  
Post-Judgment Op., 381 F. Supp. 3d at 387–88.  Moreover, the 
compensation package that Vann approved for Huber was just 
one aspect of Vann’s “continued engagement and 
communication with, and encouragement of, Huber,”18 despite 
Vann’s claiming to have been “alarmed” by the fact that 
“Huber was working on behalf of both AFS and Livingston 
contemporaneously[.]”  Id. at 387.  Given Vann’s actual 
knowledge of Huber’s attempts to move business from AFS to 
Livingston and of the wrongfulness of Huber’s actions,19 the 
 
18  Examples include attending in-person meetings with 
Huber and Vann’s knowledge that “as early as February that 
Livingston employees were sharing documents on Dropbox 
and collaborating with Huber.”  Post-Trial Op., 295 F. Supp. 
3d at 490. 
 
19 As an executive himself, Vann knew and “expressly 
confirmed his understanding of an employee’s duty of loyalty 
to their employers.”  Post-Trial Op., 295 F. Supp. 3d at 490.  
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Under Pennsylvania law, employees, in addition to officers or 
directors, may owe their employers fiduciary duties.  See 
AmQuip Crane Rental, LLC v. Crane & Rig Servs., LLC, 199 
A.3d 904, 915 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (salesman breached duty 
of loyalty to employer by helping co-workers breach their 
noncompetition agreements with employer); Reading Radio, 
Inc. v. Fink, 833 A.2d 199, 211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (radio 
station manager breached duty of loyalty to employer by not 
enforcing noncompetition agreements); see also Solid Wood 
Cabinet Co. v. Partners Home Supply, Civil Action No. 13-
3598, 2015 WL 1208182, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2015) 
(“Pennsylvania law dictates that employees owe their 
employers a duty of loyalty.”); Synthes, Inc. v. Emerge Med., 
Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 617, 667 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (same); Crown 
Coal & Coke Co. v. Compass Point Res., LLC, Civil Action 
No. 07-1208, 2009 WL 891869, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2009) 
(“Under Pennsylvania law, an employee is an agent of his 
employer and owes his employer a duty of loyalty.”).  
Relatedly, confidential relationships also can give rise to 
fiduciary duties under Pennsylvania law.  “[T]he essence of [a 
confidential] relationship is trust and reliance on one side, and 
a corresponding opportunity to abuse that trust for personal 
gain on the other. Accordingly, [a confidential relationship] 
appears when the circumstances make it certain the parties do 
not deal on equal terms, but, on the one side there is an 
overmastering influence, or, on the other, weakness, 
dependence or trust, justifiably reposed[.]”  PTSI, Inc. v. Haley, 
71 A.3d 304, 311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (quoting Weiley v. 
Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 51 A.3d 202, 218 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2012)) (alterations in original).  Here, the record plainly shows 
that Huber acted as AFS’s agent, and that they shared a 
confidential relationship in that AFS trusted Huber, and was 
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record easily supports the inference that Vann and the company 
he led, Livingston, appreciated that their continued 
encouragement and facilitation of Huber’s misdeeds would 
directly result in harm to AFS.  The record also supports the 
inference that their decision to nevertheless encourage and 
facilitate Huber’s wrongdoing in the face of that known harm 
was at the very least recklessly indifferent to AFS’s rights.   
 
Under Pennsylvania law, such conduct can support a 
punitive damages award.  See, e.g., Hutchison ex rel. 
Hutchison v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 770 (Pa. 2005) (explaining 
that punitive damages may be awarded where conduct is 
“outrageous” because of “reckless indifference to the rights of 
others[,]” and the conduct at issue was “intentional, reckless or 
malicious”) (citations and quotation marks omitted); SHV 
Coal, Inc. v. Cont’l Grain Co., 587 A.2d 702, 705 (Pa. 1991) 
(upholding punitive damages award where employee 
deliberately diverted contract to new employer during his last 
week of employment with previous employer).  Thus, Vann’s 
and Livingston’s argument that the punitive damages award 
entered against them lacks adequate factual support is wholly 
unpersuasive.20       
 
dependent on him, to handle trade secret information as well as 
to procure new client relationships and maintain existing ones.  
Huber has not at any point contended that he did not owe AFS 
a fiduciary duty of loyalty. 
 
20  Vann and Livingston also contend that the record 
does not support punitive damages because the District Court 
found that they did not act with malice or intent to harm with 
respect to AFS’s trade secret misappropriation claim.  That 
argument misses the mark because it ignores that AFS’s trade 
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We also have little difficulty rejecting Vann’s and 
Livingston’s assertion that the District Court improperly 
awarded punitive damages against them because of their lack 
of remorse for their misconduct.  To the extent the District 
Court considered Vann’s and Livingston’s contrition (or, more 
precisely, the total absence thereof) for their actions in 
determining whether their conduct warranted the imposition of 
punitive damages, it is clear that the Court did so only to the 
extent it was suggestive of their state of mind at the time of 
their wrongdoing.  There was no error in considering Vann’s 
and Livingston’s attitude for that purpose.  See In re Lemington 
Home for the Aged, 777 F.3d 620, 635 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(upholding award of punitive damages where defendants’ 
“state of mind was illuminated by their own testimony at 
 
secret misappropriation claim and its claim for aiding and 
abetting a breach of fiduciary duty were separate and distinct 
causes of action.  The District Court correctly explained that 
“AFS’s substantive claims targeted different—albeit, at times, 
overlapping—conduct. In deciding whether to award enhanced 
damages, and in what amount, we examined different 
aggravating conduct under each claim. The distinction, in our 
view, lies in defendants’ states of mind and the nature of their 
actions. Defendants’ misappropriative conduct, while knowing 
and unlawful under the statute, might fairly be characterized 
(with limited exceptions) as passive and acquiescent. Their 
tortious conduct, per contra, was active, deliberate, and 
willful; it endured without pause for the better part of a year; 
and the defendants to date fail to appreciate the gravity of their 
wrongdoing.”  Post-Judgment Op., 381 F. Supp. 3d at 391.  On 
appeal, Vann and Livingston fail to rebut the District Court’s 
persuasive rejection of their position. 
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trial[,]” which testimony allowed “the jury to infer that they 
had acted culpably and continued to avoid recognizing the 
gravity of their misconduct”).  
 
D. Set-off of Orbital Settlement21 
 
Next, all Appellants argue that the District Court 
improperly failed to set-off the value of AFS’s settlement with 
Orbital from the compensatory damages it awarded to AFS, as 
purportedly mandated by the Pennsylvania Uniform 
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (“PUCATA”).  
According to Appellants, they are entitled to a set-off under 
PUCATA because Orbital was a joint-tortfeasor.  The District 
Court held that Appellants had failed to put either AFS or the 
Court on notice that a “setoff theory was fair game at trial[.]”  
Post-Judgment Op., 381 F. Supp. 3d at 383.  We agree.          
 
The Huber Parties carry the ball for the Appellants on 
this issue and assert that it is not forfeited, for four reasons: (i) 
they were not required to file a formal pleading requesting set-
off; (ii) AFS was on notice that Appellants would seek set-off 
of the Orbital settlement; (iii) Orbital’s status as a joint 
tortfeasor was tried by the parties’ implied consent; and (iv) 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(5) permits them to, for 
 
21  The District Court held that Appellants failed to 
provide fair notice to AFS that they would be seeking setoff 
with respect to the Orbital settlement.  “We review a District 
Court’s decision as to the waiver of an affirmative defense for 
abuse of discretion.”  In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. 
VI), 921 F.3d 98, 104 (3d Cir. 2019). 
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the first time, raise the set-off issue after judgment.22  Those 
arguments, individually and collectively, fail. 
 
As to the first argument, whether or not Appellants were 
obligated to formally plead set-off under PUCATA is beside 
the point.  The District Court did not hold that Appellants 
forfeited their set-off argument solely because they neglected 
to plead it.  Rather, the Court noted the Appellants’ complete 
failure to raise the issue at any point in the litigation, up to and 
including trial.  Appellants cite no case in which a party 
seeking to set off the amount of a co-defendant’s settlement 
against a damages award did not plead, attempt to plead, or 
otherwise squarely raise that issue before judgment was 
rendered.   
 
As shown by cases on which Appellants themselves 
rely, the party invoking PUCATA must provide some clear 
indication that, even if it did not plead the set-off, it actually 
raised the issue in some fashion.  See Kilbride Invs. Ltd. v. 
Cushman & Wakefield of Pennsylvania, Inc., Civil Action No. 
13-5195, 2019 WL 3713878, *6–7  (E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2019) 
(denying the plaintiff’s pre-trial motion to voluntarily dismiss 
a defendant where co-defendant objected on the grounds that 
dismissal would inhibit its ability to claim an “offset” from the 
to-be-dismissed defendant where issue of joint tortfeasor status 
had “been an actively debated issue for well over a year,” and 
the court had previously “ordered briefing on the narrow issue 
of joint tortfeasor status between the then-remaining 
 
22  The Livingston Parties do not address in their 
briefing the question of whether they forfeited this issue before 
the District Court by failing to raise it before judgment was 
entered.     
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defendants”); Nat’l Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Kling P’ship, 504 
A.2d 1273, 1277–78 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (denying pre-trial 
motion specifically raising issue of contribution and indemnity 
from settling co-defendants).23   
 
Second, the contention that Appellants did not waive the 
set-off issue because “AFS was on adequate and early notice 
that [Appellants] would seek a set-off of the Orbital settlement 
agreement[,]” is belied by the record and Appellants’ conduct.  
Huber Parties Opening Br. at 40.  None of the examples cherry-
picked by Appellants from the voluminous record makes any 
mention of either set-off or joint-tortfeasor liability.  To the 
extent those examples speak to anything beyond the 
undisputed fact that AFS reached a settlement with Orbital and 
that Orbital was dismissed from this case, we agree with the 
District Court that they suggest only that Appellants sought to 
use the settlement agreement to impugn the objectivity and 
credibility of testimony and other evidence provided by Orbital 
sources.24  Significantly, the Huber Parties’ briefing has no 
 
23  Appellants’ reliance on Mazer v. Lipshutz, 360 F.2d 
275 (3d Cir. 1966), is likewise misplaced.  The release at issue 
in that case, although not pled, nevertheless was considered on 
appeal because the release had been admitted into evidence in 
two different, consecutive trials involving the parties, without 
objection.  Id. at 277. 
 
24  See Livingston Parties’ Statement of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law (ECF 247-2) at ¶¶ 142–43 (noting that 
AFS dismissed Orbital from suit after settling and arguing the 
settlement consideration should not be considered evidence of 
AFS’s competence to perform work); Huber Parties’ Trial 
Exhibit List (ECF 295) at 7 (identifying settlement agreement 
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explanation as to why, if set-off was truly an issue before the 
District Court, not a single defendant murmured a negative 
word about Orbital’s dismissal from the case, despite those co-
defendants having the burden of proving that Orbital was a 
joint-tortfeasor.25  In belatedly raising the issue for the first 
 
and release as exhibit); App. at 2221–40 (copies of the 
settlement agreement and related AFS/Orbital commercial 
agreement); App. at 2800–01 (trial testimony of Orbital 
employee pertaining to cooperation provision in AFS/Orbital 
settlement agreement); App. at 3015–16 (trial testimony of 
AFS employee regarding profitability of contract with Orbital 
resulting from settlement); App. at 4726 (Huber Parties’ 
requested finding of facts and conclusions of law highlighting 
cooperating provision in AFS’s settlement agreement with 
Orbital); App. at 4762 (same); App. at 5777–78 (noting that 
AFS dismissed Orbital from suit after settling and emphasizing 
Orbital promised in settlement agreement to cooperate with 
AFS in AFS’s pursuit of its claims against the other defendants 
in this case). 
 
25  See Montgomery Cty. v. Microvote Corp., 320 F.3d 
440, 450 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding defendants waived their Rule 
60(b) claim to set-off plaintiff’s settlement with purported 
joint-tortfeasor where, inter alia, “[defendants] did not attempt 
to keep [the settling defendant] in the case in order to apportion 
liability, nor did they request substitution of a settlement that 
delineated [the settling defendant]’s pro-rata share of liability” 
and “the settlement did not mention the non-settling 
defendants’ liability”); Rocco v. Johns-Manville Corp., 754 
F.2d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 1985) (“One would have expected the 
nonsettling defendants to either have requested substitution of 
[releases in which the plaintiff agrees to a pro rata reduction 
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time after trial and judgment, Appellants, without justification, 
unreasonably deprived AFS of a fair opportunity to address it 
at trial or any time prior thereto.     
 
For largely the same reasons, the assertion that the issue 
of set-off was tried by the parties’ “implied consent” 
necessarily fails.  “[I]mplied consent depends on three factors: 
‘whether the parties recognized that the unpleaded issue 
entered the case at trial, whether the evidence that supports the 
unpleaded issue was introduced at trial without objection, and 
whether a finding of trial by consent prejudiced the opposing 
party’s opportunity to respond.’”  Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, 
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 676 F.3d 318, 327 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Douglas v. Owens, 50 F.3d 1226, 1236 (3d 
Cir.1995)).  At a minimum, Appellants cannot satisfy the first 
or third criteria because the record shows that neither AFS nor 
the District Court was aware that set-off was an issue at trial, 
and that lack of awareness unfairly deprived AFS of an 
opportunity to present evidence on the issue of whether Orbital 
and Appellants were joint-tortfeasors. See Post-Judgment Op., 
381 F. Supp. 3d at 383 (“[N]o defendant ever so much as hinted 
that the isolated evidence on which they now rely–the AFS-
Orbital settlement agreement, AFS’s initial verified complaint 
in this case, and an isolated passage … [of] trial testimony–was 
introduced for the purpose of establishing Orbital as a joint 
tortfeasor.”). 
 
equal to the settlement amount from any judgment awarded 
against nonsettling defendants] or judicial determination of 
liability. The nonsettling defendants took no action, apparently 
acquiescing in the settling part[y’s] absence from the trial. That 
failure to act may be considered a waiver of any benefit from 
the [settling defendant’s release] or the amounts paid for [it].”).   
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Finally, there is no merit in the contention that Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(5) somehow excuses 
Appellants’ complete failure to raise the set-off issue before 
judgment was entered.  Rule 52(a)(5) allows a party to 
“question the sufficiency of the evidence supporting” a finding 
of fact that a district court actually makes.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
52(a)(5).  The Court did not make any relevant findings 
regarding set-off, including whether Orbital was a joint-
tortfeasor.  And that, undoubtedly, was because the issue was 
never raised.   
 
Rule 52(a)(5) does not, as the Huber Parties necessarily 
argue, contemplate new or additional findings of fact, nor does 
it sanction the injection of an entirely new and previously 
unintroduced legal theory into proceedings.  The Huber Parties 
cite no authority that would sustain their novel construction of 
Rule 52(a)(5), and we reject it, as it runs contrary both to the 
plain language of the rule and to the general notions of fairness, 
equity, and finality in dispute resolution that pervade the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Accordingly, the District 
Court did not err in excluding the Orbital settlement from its 
compensatory damages calculation.     
 
E. Lost Profit Damages Calculation26 
 
Finally, the Huber Parties challenge the District Court’s 
calculation of the lost profits awarded to AFS as damages for 
 
26  The Huber Parties challenge the District Court’s 
factual determination that certain costs should be excluded 
from its lost profits damages award.  We review that factual 
determination for clear error.  VICI Racing, 763 F.3d at 293. 
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the trade secrets misappropriation.  The Court’s damages 
figure was based in part on the terms of a contract that Orbital 
awarded to INSYSMA instead of AFS.  The Huber Parties 
contend that the Court erred as a factual matter in failing to 
account for approximately $470,000 in costs contemplated by 
the contract when determining AFS’s lost profits.  That 
argument too fails. 
 
Although the Orbital-INSYSMA contract may have 
contemplated that INSYSMA would undertake certain work 
that Huber testified would have cost INSYSMA approximately 
$470,000, there is ample evidence that Huber himself did not 
believe the work in question was actually encompassed by and 
a part of the contract.  Moreover, it is undisputed that 
INSYSMA never performed that work.  AFS, not INSYSMA, 
completed it, and that occurred only after Orbital had to sue 
INSYSMA because INSYSMA initially refused to deliver the 
underlying materials for the work.     
 
The District Court’s lost profits analysis ultimately 
rested on the amount INSYSMA actually was paid under the 
contract for the work it actually performed.  The Huber Parties 
are not entitled to a reduction in damages for expenses they 
never incurred and apparently were not obligated to incur.   
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the rulings 
and judgment of the District Court. 
 
 
